Tag Archives: Tim Connor

Healthy multiemployer pension plans achieve best funding in a decade, but unhealthy plans continue to languish

Milliman today released the results of its Spring 2018 Multiemployer Pension Funding Study (MPFS), which analyzes the funded status of all multiemployer pension plans in the United States. As of December 31, 2017, the plans achieved an aggregate funded ratio of 83%, the highest since the market collapse in 2008; a decade ago, the aggregate funded ratio of all multiemployer plans stood at 85%.

While increases in plan contributions and reductions in benefits factored into these plans’ funding improvement, stellar investment returns were the primary driver of gains for the MPFS plans. The estimated 2017 calendar year investment return for our simplified portfolio was nearly 16%—more than double the assumption of most plans. Critical plans, however, were unable to capitalize on the sturdy investment returns due to the cash flow demands that hit less healthy plans.

While healthier plans benefited from better than assumed investment earnings, critical plans are sinking in quicksand and not able to benefit enough from strong investment returns. It’s been almost 10 years since the global financial crisis, and while healthier plans have gotten their funded status levels back to where they were then, critical plans have not.

Healthy plans have a funded ratio of 93%, compared with 90% a decade ago. Critical plans’ aggregate funded ratio as of year-end is mired at 60%, compared to 76% in 2008. A closer look at critical plans in the “red” or “deep red” zones show the contributions of mature plans (those with fewer active participants) are relatively small compared to the size of the plan’s assets and liabilities. The shortfall for red zone and deep red zone plans is expected to grow unless these plans experience superior asset returns, increased contributions, and/or benefit reductions.

To view the complete study, click here.

Also, to receive regular updates of Milliman’s pension funding analysis, contact us here.

Multiemployer pension plans nearing healthiest funding since market collapse of 2008

Milliman has released the results of its Fall 2017 Multiemployer Pension Funding Study, which analyzes the funded status of all multiemployer pension plans. As of June 30, 2017, these plans are nearing the healthiest they’ve been since U.S. financial markets collapsed in 2008. In the first six months of 2017, the aggregate funding percentage for all multiemployer pensions climbed from 77% to 81%, reducing the system’s shortfall by $21 billion—an improvement driven largely by favorable investment returns.

In aggregate, asset growth for multiemployer plans far outpaced assumptions for the first half of 2017. But that bears little weight for critical plans, which are hurt by their substantially lower asset bases. Despite the bull market, we’re seeing the funding gap continue to widen between critical and noncritical plans.

While noncritical plans are nearing an aggregate funded percentage of 90%, the funding level for critical plans remains around 60%. Currently about a quarter of the plans tracked by Milliman’s Multiemployer Study fall within critical levels, with some of the most troubled on track to rely on assistance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC)—which itself is facing severe financial challenges. Comparatively, of the approximately 1,250 plans analyzed in the study, around 75% are considered noncritical.

To view the complete study, click here.

Also, to receive regular updates of Milliman’s pension funding analysis, contact us here.

Multiemployer pension funding levels experience slight uptick overall, but poor plans grow poorer

Milliman has released the results of its Spring 2017 Multiemployer Pension Funding Study, which analyzes the funded status of all multiemployer pension plans. As of December 31, 2016, these plans have an aggregate funding percentage of 77%, a 1% increase since June 2016. During that six-month period, the market value of assets increased by $17 billion while pension liabilities increased by $13 billion, resulting in a $4 billion decrease in the aggregate funding status shortfall.

But results vary by plan; while noncritical plans experienced an aggregate funding percentage of nearly 85%, the funding level for critical plans is under 60%. The gap continues to widen between critical and noncritical plans. While the funding percentage of healthier plans has increased slightly, critical plans have seen no appreciable increase. Persistent strong returns would be needed to see any appreciable improvement in funded status.

A closer look into how contributions are distributed shows that plans facing severe funding challenges only spend 38 cents of each contribution dollar on new benefit accruals, while 50 cents of every dollar goes to pay down funding shortfalls. Healthier plans spend 56 cents per contribution dollar on benefit accruals and 32 cents on funding shortfalls. The remaining 12 cents in both scenarios is spent on expenses.

This is the first of three pension funding studies Milliman will be releasing this week. To view the complete study, click here. To receive regular updates of Milliman’s pension funding analysis, contact us here.

The Multiemployer Pension Reform Act and the Central States Pension Plan controversy: What is at stake?

Connor_TimThe Multiemployer Pension Reform Act of 2014 (MPRA) allows certain multiemployer plans that are projected to become insolvent to reduce benefits indefinitely. Ordinarily, when a multiemployer plan goes insolvent, it receives annual financial assistance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to support payment of retiree benefits at maximum guaranteed levels. However, the PBGC program itself is in dire straits, recently projecting its own multiemployer program insolvency by 2025. At that point, the PBGC is essentially predicting it will not have enough money to provide the support needed to maintain retiree benefit levels. This means that retiree benefits in an insolvent plan could potentially be reduced below the PBGC-guaranteed levels because there wouldn’t be enough combined money available from the plan and the PBGC to support those levels.

The Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Plan (Central States) reported that its own projected insolvency will occur in 2026 in its application to the U.S. Treasury Department in 2015 to implement MPRA suspensions. The plan has close to 400,000 total participants, roughly half of whom are retired. The MPRA cuts, some of which are as high as 70%, are actually designed to produce higher benefit amounts than would be paid if the plan actually went insolvent, although MPRA cuts would be effective July 1, 2016, instead of upon actual insolvency.

The Treasury is scheduled to approve or deny the Central States application by May 7, 2016. During the review, the Treasury has heard from participants and advocate groups that cuts were not designed in an equitable manner; steps were not properly taken by the plan to avoid the current situation; future projections are not based on reasonable assumptions; and, in general, the law is unjust and unfair to the participants involved. Ultimately, it would take Congressional action to address that last concern. In the present, the Treasury will have to review and decide if Central States followed the terms of MPRA in designing its solution to avoid insolvency. If the Treasury approves the application, it will go to a vote. However, even if the participants vote no, it may not matter because the Treasury is likely obligated by MPRA to override the vote and implement some form of suspensions anyway because Central States is likely deemed to be a “systemically important plan,” one which requires $1 billion or more of PBGC assistance.

For now, all eyes are on May 7, waiting to see how the Treasury proceeds. Multiemployer plan sponsors and participants will no doubt pay close attention and stay tuned to any whispers of potential success in attempts by various parties in repealing or changing MPRA in any material way, despite those attempts looking unlikely today. In the meantime, the task for other sponsors in keeping their plans healthy and adequately funded is more essential than ever, and needs to be continually executed with careful attention.

For more perspective, read Tim’s article “Central States Pension Plan and the Multiemployer Pension Reform Act.”

What to look ahead for in pension risk management

The Variable Annuity Pension Plan (VAPP) is now the Milliman Sustainable Income PlanTM (SIP).

Defined benefit plan sponsors are concerned about contribution and funded status volatility. Some recent pension risk management strategies have focused on liability-driven investing (LDI) and lump-sum distributions. In this article, Milliman consultants Tim Connor, Scott Preppernau, and Zorast Wadia discuss in general terms methods that plan sponsors may implement to de-risk their pensions moving forward.

Here is an excerpt:

We suspect that 2014 will see a continued trend of sponsors looking to de-risk their plans through the various methods mentioned above. In addition, we believe sponsors will investigate the benefits of a hybrid plan design such as the variable annuity plan for the reasons mentioned above.

Another trend likely to continue is the implementation of lump-sum windows or permanently increased lump-sum thresholds. These strategies have found favor with many plan sponsors, particularly in response to recent increases in Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) premiums. Because PBGC premiums include a per-participant charge, and because that charge has increased substantially in recent years, sponsors will no doubt continue to take a hard look at the idea of offering lump sums if it translates into fewer participants for whom they must pay those premiums. In addition, the rates utilized to pay out lump sums have been fully phased in for a few years now, from the previous basis of 30-year Treasury rates. That old basis resulted in a period of time where lump sums were seen as costly to sponsors. That is no longer the case. On a U.S. GAAP accounting basis, plans are valuing liability at rates that are close to the rates that are now utilized to pay lump sums. In other words, there is no longer much of an accounting gain or loss to a plan that pays out a lump sum. Yet, it does accomplish de-risking by transferring management of the pension to the participant.

On the investment side, we also expect sponsors to explore some nontraditional de-risking solutions. Not all sponsors share the belief that leaving the space of equity investments makes sense in the long term. Some feel they can’t afford not to be seeking returns in the market. For them, a tail risk hedging investment strategy can be an attractive de-risking solution. A typical strategy allows for upside through equity investments, while at the same time mitigating downside losses that occur in volatile, declining markets. The concept of hedging tail risk is quite familiar to the insurance industry, which utilizes such strategies to manage its own risk in guaranteeing certain products, such as variable annuities. It makes natural sense for defined benefit plan sponsors to incorporate the approach to de-risk their own pension promises.

Read Grant Camp and Kelly Coffing’s article Making the case for variable annuity pension plans (VAPPs) to learn more about the variable annuity pension plan design. Also, for more Milliman perspective on lump-sum distributions, click here.

What to look for in 2012: Defined contribution plans

Defined contribution (DC) plans
July 1, 2012, is a significant date for defined contribution (DC) plan sponsors, including persons who have legal responsibility for managing someone else’s money, trustees, and investment committee members. By that date, plan sponsors should have received information from all plan service providers disclosing their status as it relates to the plan, such as an ERISA fiduciary and/or registered investment advisor, their estimated fees, how they are compensated, and the services they provide. The new U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) regulations are intended to improve fee disclosure to regulators, plan sponsors, and plan participants. Plan sponsors have a fiduciary responsibility to review, for reasonableness, the compensation of their service providers that is paid from plan assets both directly and indirectly. However, in our experience, some plan sponsors are not aware of the total amount of fees paid from the plan or how they are calculated.

Many plan fiduciaries may not be aware that it is both a fiduciary breach and prohibited transaction to allow the plan to pay more than what is considered reasonable expenses. In practice, how does a fiduciary determine if plan fees are reasonable? If you’ve taken your plan out to bid within the last three years, you should have current market information and documentation for your due diligence files to support the fees you are paying, or have taken action by going back to your service provider(s) to negotiate lower fees on behalf of plan participants. In lieu of going out to bid, there are other options available: for example, you can benchmark your plan. The DOL has developed fee disclosure worksheets that can be found on their website at: DOL Publications “Understanding Retirement Plan Fees and Expenses “ and “Cost Disclosure Sheet.”

There is nothing in the regulations to imply a plan must have the lowest fees, just that the plan’s fees be reasonable and commensurate with the services provided. Qualitative differences in services may impact fees. For example, quality of service varies with respect to the range of planning and guidance tools available to participants, which may drive up fees. We strongly encourage plan sponsors to develop a diligent process to evaluate fees on an ongoing basis and to document their processes. Costly litigation can be avoided by implementing a sound process, which shows that you have taken reasonable steps to fulfill your plan fiduciary responsibilities.